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Abstract 
The paper presents a new classification of monetary policy frameworks which it applies to 
‘advanced’ and 'emerging' economies for the period since the end of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. The classification is multi-dimensional, in particular while the 
main focus is on the monetary authorities' objectives and account is taken of both pre-
announced targets and actual performance, it also emphasises the development of the 
underlying monetary and financial infrastructure which conditions the instruments available to 
the monetary authorities and therefore the coherence of different policy frameworks. It is based 
in large part on information obtained from a close reading of the monetary policy elements of 
IMF Article IV consultations. The two major changes which can be seen in the data are the 
swing over time in these countries towards a heavier focus on inflation, and the trend towards 
more systematic and coherent monetary arrangements which are typically associated with 
lower inflation and better, or at least not lower, economic growth. The classification, which 
will eventually be extended to cover developing countries as well, should enable researchers 
in the future to address a number of questions about comparative economic performance in a 
more nuanced way than has so far been possible. 
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This paper represents the first outcome of a wider research project on the evolution of 
countries’ monetary policy frameworks since the demise of the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system. A monetary policy 'framework' is used here to refer to the objectives and the 
context that condition monetary policy decisions: primarily the objectives pursued by the 
monetary authorities,1 but also the set of constraints and conventions within which their 
monetary policy decisions are taken. Section 1 explains why and how such a classification can 
make a useful and fruitful contribution to research. Section 2 discusses the key principles which 
should underlie a comprehensive classification, and then explains the precise criteria involved 
in distinguishing between the different frameworks identified. Section 3 discusses the 
implementation of these principles and criteria with illustrations of individual countries. 
Section 4 reports the results of the classification for 27 'advanced' countries/currency areas and 
33 'emerging' economies, and provides the overall findings by subperiod on the basis of two 
different possible aggregations of the frameworks. Section 5 reports the results of a simple 
unconditional analysis of the inflation and growth performance associated with the different 
frameworks. Section 6 concludes. The basic classification data, together with the 'Individual 
country details' which explain the classification for each country in each period, are now 
available on the www.monetaryframeworks.org website. 
 
1 Rationale 
There is a substantial existing literature (see Tavlas, Dellas and Stockman, 2008, for a survey) 
on the classification of exchange rate regimes, which was stimulated by (among other 
contributions) Calvo and Reinhart's (2002) finding that many countries which claimed to have 
floating exchange rates were in fact intervening directly in the forex market and/or 
                                                 
1 The term 'monetary authorities' refers to the combination of government plus central bank where the latter is 
not independent, and to the central bank where it is. 
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manipulating their interest rates in order to stabilise their exchange rates. This implied that 
there could be substantial differences between de jure (‘announced’, that is, declared by 
member countries to the IMF) and de facto (actual, realised) exchange rate regimes, and led to 
the construction of new, de facto, classifications of these regimes. The two most substantial 
and well-known such classifications are those by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), who 
used statistical data to classify exchange rate regimes by individual years, and Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), who used both announcements and realised data, typically for longer periods 
than one year.2 The IMF, which used to publish purely de jure classifications, began to publish 
an annual de facto classification in 1998, and this was made more consistent and 
comprehensive with the revisions introduced by Habermeier et al. (2009). 
 
For monetary regimes, on the other hand, the classification and de jure/de facto issues have 
attracted little attention. There is a small literature on whether the Bundesbank in the mid-
1970s to late 1990s was really targeting money as it claimed, or targeting inflation (Bernanke 
and Mihov, 1997). But researchers have mostly relied on monetary authorities' announcements, 
e.g. of monetary or inflation targets,3 and there are no comprehensive de facto classifications 
of monetary regimes.4 Roger (2010), for example, presents graphs showing the evolution of 
monetary regimes between 1989 and 2006 (see also Schmidt-Hebbel, 2010). However, the 
Eurozone and the US (which do not or did not until recently have precise formal targets for 
inflation) are also sometimes referred to as ‘informal inflation targeters’, albeit not always on 
a clear basis, and some researchers have included the Eurozone countries in their category of 
inflation targeters (e.g. Cecchetti, King and Yetman, 2011).  
                                                 
2 Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) provide a judicious defence of the de jure classification, and also use a 
‘consensus’ classification which omits cases where de facto and de jure classifications yield different results. 
3 Under IMF rules countries have to declare their exchange rate regimes, and that is the source of the de jure 
classification, but there is no corresponding obligation to declare the monetary policy framework. 
4 Cobham (2015) provides a statistics-based analysis of the de facto objectives of monetary policy for advanced 
countries, but this is not the same as monetary policy regimes or frameworks. 
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Even in the absence of the de jure/de facto issue, however, there is a need to bring together the 
exchange rate and (other) monetary policy elements in a single comprehensive evaluation of 
monetary frameworks, because of the obvious relations between them. Inflation targeting 
typically (and, arguably, necessarily) involves floating exchange rates while hard exchange 
rate pegs largely preclude the active use of interest rate or money policies, though intermediate 
exchange rate flexibility can coexist with some monetary autonomy (however, see also Frankel, 
Schmukler and Serven, 2004, and Rey, 2015).  
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) implicitly acknowledge the importance of non-exchange rate 
monetary elements when they distinguish 'freely floating' exchange rate regimes with well-
organised monetary policies, such as those of the US, Australia and Japan, from 'freely falling' 
regimes with poorly disciplined monetary policies resulting in high inflation (40% or more is 
their criterion) and inevitable depreciation, such as Argentina in the 1980s. Bailliu, Lafrance 
and Perrault (2003) address the issue by supplementing their exchange rate classification, for 
countries with intermediate or floating regimes, by information on other nominal anchors for 
monetary policy. In recent years (for example, 2014) the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions identifies whether countries have an exchange rate 
anchor, a monetary target, an inflation targeting framework or some other monetary policy 
framework, against their (de facto) exchange rate arrangement. The ‘other’ category here 
includes the US and the Eurozone countries, which suggests that this part of the classification 
is more de jure than de facto; it is also relatively ‘coarse’ in its (monetary policy) categories. 
 
The aim of this research is to construct and apply a methodology to classify countries' monetary 
policy frameworks over the period since the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary 
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arrangements in the early 1970s (the 1950s and 1960s are less interesting because in nearly all 
countries policy was dominated by fixed exchange rate parities, and there were few, if any, 
instances of anything that could be called monetary or inflation targets in the modern senses). 
The classification will take into account both pre-announced targets for exchange rates, 
monetary aggregates and inflation, and the realised values of these and other indicators. In 
other words, the project will bring together exchange rate and (other) monetary elements in a 
single comprehensive classification of monetary policy frameworks, which draws on de jure 
(pre-announced targets) as well as de facto (realised data) inputs. 
 
The classification will facilitate a more precise account of the development of monetary policy 
strategies than is currently available. It should also be of significant value to researchers 
investigating the large number of questions where there is a need for a clear identification of 
the monetary frameworks used by different countries at different times. Several examples may 
be given. First, attempts to assess the reasons why some countries experienced deeper and/or 
longer recessions as a result of the 2007-8 financial crisis (e.g. Ólafsson and Pétursson, 2011; 
Cecchetti, King and Yetman, 2011) have included dummy variables for inflation targeting and 
for hard peg exchange rate regimes; such work would benefit from a more precise and nuanced 
classification of monetary frameworks. A second example is the research by Frappa and 
Mésonnier (2011) which investigated whether asset price volatility was higher under inflation 
targeting. A third example is work on the impact of exchange rate regimes on international 
trade in gravity models, where it would be useful to investigate the effects on trade of monetary 
policy frameworks overall rather than just currency unions (as in Rose, 2000) or even a wider 
menu of exchange rate regimes (as in Adam and Cobham, 2007); this might, for example, shed 
additional light on the Calvo and Mishkin (2003) argument for policymakers to focus on 
financial, fiscal and monetary institutions rather than just exchange rate regimes. A fourth 
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example is work on the determinants of countries’ choices of exchange rate regimes, e.g. Juhn 
and Mauro (2002), Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2010), where the research question 
can be opened out into the choice of monetary policy framework, rather than just exchange rate 
regime, and a precise classification of frameworks is essential. 
 
There will also be scope for further work on economic performance under different monetary 
policy frameworks. A particular example here is the issue of the suitability of inflation targeting 
for emerging market economies. While in some academic policymaking circles there has 
developed a presumption that inflation targeting is the best possible arrangement and one to 
which all countries should aspire, some doubts have been cast on this presumption by authors 
including Ball (2010) who examines the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of inflation 
targeting, Cobham (2011) who discusses the costs of the financial institutions infrastructure 
required, and Boughzala and Cobham (2011) who emphasise exchange rate and other asset 
price issues; see also Frankel (2010). One explanation for Ball’s finding that IT seems to have 
benefits for emerging economies (whereas its benefits for advanced economies are minimal) 
may be that comparisons between IT and non-IT advanced countries are comparing well-
organised and disciplined monetary policy frameworks on both sides, whereas comparisons 
between IT and non-IT emerging economies may be in effect comparing well-organised and 
disciplined monetary policy frameworks for IT countries with sometimes less well-organised 
and disciplined frameworks on the other side; this point may also have some relevance for 
advanced countries in the 1970s and 1980s. An improved classification of monetary 
frameworks would facilitate like for like comparisons and in general would help to distinguish 
more clearly the advantages (and disadvantages) of inflation targeting relative to other modern, 
well-organised, monetary frameworks. 
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2 Key principles and their application 
Monetary policy frameworks can be thought of as combinations of the objectives of the 
monetary authorities (including their understanding of the trade-offs between those objectives) 
and the set of constraints and conventions – the former more binding, the latter more matters 
of established usage – within which specific (conjunctural) monetary policy decisions are 
made. The constraints and conventions which are relevant here include the rules or disciplines 
to which the authorities are subject (voluntarily or involuntarily), the nature of the financial 
and monetary markets and institutions in existence, the understandings (on the parts of the 
monetary authorities and of the society) of key macroeconomic relationships, and the political 
environment within which the monetary authorities operate.  While some frameworks 
completely or almost completely dictate the actions of the monetary authorities, e.g. currency 
boards, others such as inflation targeting allow varying scope for (constrained) discretion, 
while others allow even wider discretion. In any case, any given framework can be operated 
more or less well or badly, that is, with more or less competence and commitment on the part 
of the monetary authorities. Here the aim is to define a set of monetary policy frameworks 
which recognises the crucial differences – in frameworks, not in specific decisions – across 
countries and time periods but still allows comparisons to be made between broadly similar 
cases. Factors such as the degree of capital account openness, the degree of central bank 
independence, the use by the monetary authorities of credit targets within a 'reserve money 
programme' or a country's participation in an IMF-monitored stabilisation package are treated 
as important elements of the context, but the focus for the classification is the objectives of the 
monetary authorities and the extent to which they are attained. 
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Classification is about collecting some cases in one category and other cases in other categories, 
so what is important is the distinctions between the various categories. In this connection there 
are six major distinctions which are appropriate for countries with relatively modern, or 
developed, financial and monetary systems: 
• do the monetary authorities (central bank and/or ministry of finance) publish targets for 
some (intermediate or final) objective, or do they exercise short-term discretion over what 
objectives they pursue and how? 
• where such targets exist, are they for monetary aggregates, exchange rates, inflation or, 
indeed, some other variable? 
• where such targets exist, are they precise and narrow or wide and broad-brush?  
• are such targets static or stationary (the same each year) or are they ‘converging’, e.g. 
involving an exchange rate crawl or a declining trend from high to low monetary growth 
or inflation? 
• are these targets fulfilled, or not? 
• if policy is not focused on one (or more) specified and quantified objectives, is the policy 
framework well defined and clearly structured, that is, do the authorities have both a clear 
view of what they want and the means to achieve their various objectives? 
 
In addition, for countries with less developed financial and monetary systems, particularly in 
earlier periods, two additional distinctions are required. First, it is useful to identify an 
exchange rate fix, where the exchange rate is fixed entirely by central bank action in interactions 
which the central bank dominates,5 as opposed to an exchange rate target, where there is an 
autonomous foreign exchange market not dominated by the central bank, where intervention 
                                                 
5 For example, the central bank acts as one side of every transaction, using rates which it sets itself, typically 
with very narrow spreads; or the central bank allows banks to undertake transactions but only at narrow spreads 
which it sets itself.. 
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in that market is only one of the tools used, and where a more or less active monetary policy is 
focused on controlling the exchange rate. Within the fix category a 'pure' exchange rate fix, 
where no monetary policy instruments are deployed, can be distinguished from an  'augmented' 
exchange rate fix where some basic instruments are used (but typically directed towards 
objectives other than exchange rate stabilisation, in a context of limited capital mobility). 
 
It is necessary to identify separately the case where multiple direct controls are employed, 
including multiple exchange rates, direct controls on bank lending and/or administered interest 
rates, with no sense of monetary policy objectives and with the financial system essentially 
geared to the provision of finance for investments determined in a state plan. This is the 
monetary policy framework associated with command economies.  
 
The approach developed here therefore starts (like the exchange rate regime classification of 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) by asking if there is a pre-announced target for monetary policy. 
Here targets which do not drive monetary policy, either because they represent government 
aspirations which are not internalised by the monetary authorities, or because they are merely 
internal projections on the part of the authorities with no element of pre-commitment or 
preannouncement, are excluded.6 Next, the approach asks what variable is being targeted: 
exchange rate (where it differentiates as above between fixes and targets) or monetary 
aggregate or inflation;7 how precise that target is; and whether it is stationary or converging. 
The next stage is to examine whether the target is fulfilled, or not: a framework which includes 
an identified target must be observed in practice as well as announced. In addition, the approach 
                                                 
6 Moreover, the focus is on targets that drive monetary policy as a whole rather than, for example, exchange rate 
arrangements which are disconnected from overall monetary policy and sustained, typically, by exchange controls 
(rather than monetary instruments). 
7 There is no evidence so far of systematic preannounced targeting of any other variable such as nominal 
income. 
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allows for combinations of (specific) objectives, distinguishing between situations where one 
or the other of two objectives is dominant and where they are equally weighted.  
 
Where no target is announced so that the extent to which the (presumably multiple but 
unquantified) objectives are met cannot be assessed, or where the announced target is clearly 
not attained, the analysis considers (as far as it can) the clarity of the objectives of the monetary 
authorities, including their perceptions of the trade-offs between them, and then turns to the 
effectiveness of the instruments available: do the monetary authorities in some particular case 
have the ability to pursue serious targets? The classification therefore identifies cases of 
multiple direct controls as above and then distinguishes between three types of discretion: 
‘unstructured’, 'loosely structured' and  ‘well structured’, where the triage between these three 
focuses on both the monetary policy objectives of the monetary authorities and their 
instruments. ‘Well structured’ indicates that the monetary authorities have both a coherent set 
of objectives, in the sense that they have a clear view of their preferences, on the one hand, and 
of the trade-offs between them, on the other, and a precise and effective set of instruments. 
'Unstructured’ discretion indicates both that the priorities of the monetary authorities and the 
trade-offs between objectives as perceived by them are not clear and that the instruments 
available to them are largely ineffective (that is, not capable of delivering the desired outcome). 
Between these two categories there is what can be called 'loosely structured’ discretion, 
covering cases where the instruments are effective but the objectives and trade-offs are unclear; 
or where the objectives and trade-offs are clear but the instruments are ineffective; or (more 
often) where both criteria are partly but only partly fulfilled. This last category covers a range 
of different monetary arrangements, and partly for this reason is very common; but there seems 
to be no clear principle that would make it possible to disaggregate it further. 
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Finally the exercise identifies the case where a country uses another sovereign's currency 
(dollarisation or euroization); the case where a country has chosen to join a currency union and 
therefore has no national monetary policy framework of its own (so the empirical classification 
focuses instead on the framework of the union-level central bank); and two separate categories 
for currency boards. In both of the latter the domestic currency must typically be backed 100% 
by foreign exchange held by the domestic currency issuer,8 but it is useful to differentiate 
between the 'pure' case where a currency board operates within a very limited financial system 
and the 'augmented' case where there is a more developed financial and monetary system and 
some monetary instruments can be deployed.9  
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Table 1 sets out the complete list of categories identified. In implementing the classification, 
however, some further criteria and/or definitions are needed, and those that will be used here 
are as follows. First, ‘full’ targeting requires that ‘narrow’ stationary announced targets are 
‘typically attained’. To be ‘narrow’, targets need to be point targets or, for exchange rates, 
parities with margins of no more than 2.25% on either side (those are the margins set at the 
Smithsonian agreement at the end of the Bretton Woods period, or the narrow margins 
originally used within the European Monetary System); for monetary aggregates, ranges of no 
more than 3% (which includes, for example, most German and French monetary targets but 
not all UK or US ones); and for inflation, ranges of no more than 2% (the most common range 
for inflation targeters, see Hammond, 2012). To be ‘typically attained’, the outcome for a 
monetary aggregate or inflation should be within the target range over the period specified or 
                                                 
8 See Wolf et al (2008) p49, including note 7. 
9 This distinction corresponds broadly to that made by Wolf et al (2008, chapter 2) between early and modern 
currency boards, where the former were essentially aimed at facilitating trade for existing underdeveloped 
monetary systems, typically in a colonial context, while the latter were more concerned with establishing monetary 
policy credibility in more complex monetary and financial environments under political independence. 
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no more than 1% below or above the range or, where there is a point target only, within 2% on 
either side of that target; slightly wider outcomes could be accepted for much higher targets 
(e.g. monetary targets above 10%); for exchange rate targets, the actual rate should remain 
within the margins specified. In addition, within a run of years in which targets are mostly 
attained, a single year deviation is ignored or a longer deviation is ignored where it is clear that 
expectations remain anchored.10 The point of these relatively generous criteria is to identify the 
monetary policy frameworks as they are understood and as they influence both policy decisions 
and expectations: small occasional deviations do not compromise the perceived existence of 
frameworks, while large and repeated deviations do.  
 
‘Loose’ targeting, on the other hand, requires either that narrow targets are missed by no more 
than 1% beyond the limits defined above, or that wider targets – e.g. target ranges for monetary 
aggregates of 4% – are hit according to those criteria. ‘Wider’ targets have wider ranges than 
narrow targets or are less clearly specified, where less clearly specified targets include, for 
example, definitions of price stability goals rather than inflation targets, or even cases where 
no precise targets are specified. In the latter case, where the monetary authorities are 
consistently pursuing some unannounced and unquantified target, that pursuit is likely to be 
identified in the sources used (see below) and its attainment can be checked, but the lack of 
announcement rules out 'full' targeting. 
 
Converging targets are ones which change (in most cases, decline) regularly over time, as 
opposed to, for example, stationary inflation targets which are constant over time. Finally, in 
the mixed target categories ‘dominant’ is decided on the basis of which of two targets of 
                                                 
10 In practice this refers only to inflation targeting in the later part of the period, where for some countries and 
years at least it is possible to get consistent evidence on expectations. 
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different kinds are more fully met, and ‘primacy unclear’ refers to cases where both are attained 
to an equal extent. The (rare) combinations of three objectives – exchange rate, monetary 
aggregate and inflation – are also considered together in a single category, whichever is 
dominant. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Table 2 collects these criteria and definitions together for convenience, and they should be 
sufficient to distinguish between all the various cases of exchange rate, monetary and inflation 
targeting (categories 7-22 and 26-31 in Table 1). However, there are a number of pairs of 
categories for which it is useful to indicate more clearly the basis on which they will be 
distinguished from each other in the implementation of the classification: 
• pure or augmented exchange rate fix versus (any form of) exchange rate targeting: the key 
difference is that in the fixes more or less all transactions involve the central bank as one 
of the counterparties or are transacted at rates which the central bank sets, and there is no 
separate or autonomous foreign exchange market where banks or other agents freely 
transact with each other; whereas in exchange rate targeting there is an autonomous foreign 
exchange market in which other agents operate and the central bank intervenes more or less 
frequently; the margins in fix cases are typically much narrower (e.g. 0.5% or less) than 
those in targeted markets  
• pure versus augmented exchange rate fix: in both cases the central bank fixes the exchange 
rate via its actions within a market which it dominates, but in PERF it deploys no other 
monetary policy instruments whereas in AERF it uses from time to time some basic 
instruments such as reserve requirements, typically aimed at other objectives 
13 
 
• pure or augmented exchange rate fix versus pure or augmented currency board: the key 
difference is that in the currency board all domestic currency is backed by the central bank's 
holdings of foreign currency; this is therefore a more tightly regulated arrangement 
• augmented exchange rate fix versus unstructured discretion: under the former some basic 
monetary instruments are deployed, typically aimed at objectives other than the exchange 
rate itself, but nevertheless the exchange rate is the central concern of policy; under the 
latter the exchange rate may still be subject to a (probably varying) fix but the authorities 
have more concern with other objectives as well (typically economic activity or growth and 
inflation) and use a wider range of instruments 
• pure versus augmented currency board: the difference lies in the extent to which other 
monetary policy instruments are deployed: none in the first case but a few – typically 
including reserve requirements but also standing facilities and some limited possibility of 
lender of last resort operations – in the second11 
• multiple direct controls versus unstructured discretion: the former corresponds to a 
command economy, where the financial system is merely the counterpart of the planning 
process, whereas in unstructured discretion there is some kind of an autonomous banking 
system which is at least partly independent of any state planning mechanism 
• unstructured discretion versus loosely structured discretion: in the former the monetary 
policy instruments are weak, and actual as well as potential fiscal dominance is common, 
while the monetary authorities do not have a clear idea of the priorities they should be 
following or of the trade-offs between their various objectives; in the latter case the 
instruments are weak but the objectives are clear and coherent, or the instruments are 
effective but the objectives are unclear and incoherent, or the instruments are partly 
effective and the objectives partly clear and coherent; in loosely structured but not in 
                                                 
11 See, for example, the differences highlighted in Wolf et al (2008, Tables A1.5-6). 
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unstructured discretion there would typically be a money market and some sort of 
government securities market so that monetary policy is operated at least in part through 
indirect instruments; in the unstructured case fiscal dominance is the norm, whereas in the 
loosely structured case it is typically possible but not always realised 
• loosely structured discretion versus mixed targets (monetary, exchange rate and/or 
inflation): in the former case the objectives are unclear or at least unquantified, but in the 
latter they are quantified (and met) 
• loosely structured discretion versus well structured discretion: under well structured 
discretion the authorities have a complete set of effective indirect policy instruments (which 
requires a full set of money and securities markets and the absence of fiscal dominance), a 
clear ranking of their own objectives and a full understanding of the trade-offs between 
those objectives  
[Table 3 near here] 
 
These distinctions are summarised in Table 3. In total there are 32 different categories in this 
classification. It would, of course, be possible to construct an even finer grid of frameworks, 
but the danger is that the classification ends up identifying every country episode separately, 
and no useful comparisons can be made. On the other hand, 32 categories is obviously too large 
for many purposes, notably for econometric work. However, the classification has been 
constructed in part with an eye to aggregation, and there are at least two useful aggregations 
which can be made. First, the categories can be aggregated by target variable – exchange rate 
(but keeping the distinction between fix and target), money, inflation, mixed targets and 
different types of discretion.12 Second, they can be aggregated by the degree of control of 
                                                 
12 The three types of discretion typically involve such different specifications of objectives – undefined and 
incoherent for UD, clearer but often unstable (switching over time) for LSD, and clear, coherent and stable for 
WSD – that it is not useful to aggregate them together. 
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overall monetary conditions provided by the monetary policy framework. In this case the 
aggregation consists of 'rudimentary', i.e. multiple direct controls or pure exchange rate fix; 
'intermediate', e.g. augmented exchange rate fix or unstructured discretion; 'substantial', where 
there is significant but not comprehensive monetary control, e.g. loose targeting and loosely 
structured discretion; and 'intensive', which includes full targeting of different kinds and well 
structured discretion. These aggregations are set out in detail in Table 4. 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
3 Implementation and examples 
While recent inflation targets are easily located from central banks’ websites, it is often more 
difficult to find the details of monetary and even exchange rate targets for earlier decades. 
However, there is a source which can be tapped for this: the IMF Article IV consultation 
reports, including both Staff Reports (SR) and Recent Economic Developments (RED) papers 
(and their successors in later years13), which are now available in the IMF’s electronic archives. 
This material is essentially real time (such consultations are held every one or two years) so 
that the evolution of policy frameworks can be traced as it happened and as it was seen at the 
time. The reports typically provide information on the aims and objectives of the monetary 
authorities, so that any serious and consistent pursuit of an informal (unannounced) target can 
be identified.14 They also provide information on the outcome for target variables, which is 
particularly important for monetary aggregates and some inflation targets where the targets are 
set for national definitions not covered in standard statistical sources such as the IMF’s 
                                                 
13 In the 1990s and onwards the RED papers are replaced by a variety of Selected Issues or Background Papers, 
while the SRs tend to include more purely descriptive material. 
14 That is, targets which are de facto but not de jure can be identified.  
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International Financial Statistics (IFS).15 The classification process involves the examination 
of (parts of) 50 or so documents per country for the 41 years covered. 
 
In principle there is a question about the independence and objectivity of these IMF reports: it 
could be, for example, that the IMF staff typically push the same standard policies from the 
same standard perspective on all countries so that the reports provide a distorted view of the 
issues and developments concerned.16 However, the internal evidence is that the IMF has 
supported different monetary policies in different countries at different times, and the reports 
– which are negotiated and agreed with the authorities in the relevant countries – often set out 
the points on which IMF staff and national authorities agree and disagree.17 There is also a 
contrast between the monetary policy and the fiscal policy content of these reports: on the latter 
the IMF staff do indeed seem to recommend on nearly every occasion the same medicine – 
cuts in public spending and in the budget deficit – in a way that validates the old joke (that IMF 
stands for It’s Mainly Fiscal). The explanation for this difference may be that on monetary 
questions the IMF staff are discussing largely technical issues with central bankers who have 
at least some technical expertise, whereas on fiscal matters they are discussing unavoidably 
politicised budgetary issues with politicians who (IMF staff believe) have political axes to 
grind, and the IMF has a legitimate concern about fiscal dominance and the effect of deficits 
on monetary growth. 
 
                                                 
15 In the 1970s, in particular, a number of countries pegged their currencies to particular baskets, the weights for 
which (if and when they are disclosed) are also not easily available elsewhere. 
16 This is likely to be more of a problem for emerging and developing countries than for advanced. 
17 For example, the IMF staff showed no inhibitions in the 2000s about urging the Federal Reserve to introduce a 
formal inflation target, or about pressing the European Central Bank to clarify its monetary pillar, and those 
authorities showed no inhibitions in defending their chosen policies. Many emerging countries have also 
sometimes resisted IMF pressure for more interest rate or exchange rate flexibility.  
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This material can also be supplemented with, and checked against, overviews of the 
development of monetary frameworks from central bank and other sources. Later perspectives 
sometimes provide clearer views about long run developments, as well as revised data on 
targeting outcomes.18 
 
 The definition of 'advanced' and, even more, of 'emerging' economies is not clear-cut, with the 
latter often depending on the investment opportunities identified by investment banks. Here, 
for want of a better principle, the groupings of advanced and emerging countries used in 
Laurens et al. (2009) are used throughout; these are different, for example, from the 
classification in the IMF's International Financial Statistics, which appears to treat all 
members of the Euro area as advanced economies (but not, for example, Poland). On this basis 
the paper covers 26 advanced countries plus the Euro currency area, and 33 emerging 
economies.19 
 
Before reporting the overall results some individual country illustrations will be useful. The 
following tables and others corresponding to each of the 60 countries/currency areas are now 
available on the www.monetaryframeworks.org website. Each table has at the bottom a 
selection of the most relevant IMF references and, in some cases, additional sources used, so 
that in principle the reader can find the rationale for the classifications. 
 
                                                 
18 Houben (2000) is particularly useful as a source on European countries pre-1999; it includes revised data on 
target outcomes which were checked with the relevant central banks. 
19 Laurens et al. (2009) identify 24 advanced economies; included here are also Hong Kong and Luxembourg, 
which do not appear anywhere in their list.  They also identify 31 emerging economies; included here are also 
Cyprus and Malta, which also do not appear in their list.  
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First, Australia provides an example of a country which tries a variety of frameworks  - 
exchange rate fix, monetary targets and ad hoc discretion – before eventually homing in on 
inflation targeting, initially informal and then formal: 
Australia 
Years Targets and attainment Classification 
1974-76 currency fixed to USD then to basket, central bank sets 
middle rate with very narrow margins permitted; 
monetary policy instruments include interest rates, 
direct and indirect controls on bank lending and special 
reserve deposit ratio; efforts to increase non-monetary 
financing of budget deficits 
augmented exchange 
rate fix AERF 
1977-83 exchange rate devalued November 1976, then exchange 
rate adjusted little and often, until large devaluation 
March 1983; monetary 'projections' or 'expected 
growth', first given in March 1976, not regarded as 
targets, but met or nearly met 5 years out of 7; main 
monetary policy instrument now is OMOs  
loose monetary 
targeting LMT 
1984-92 exchange rate floated  and most exchange controls 
abolished late 1983; wider financial reform helps move 
towards indirect monetary instruments; monetary target 
well overshot 1984 and not renewed; ad hoc policy and 
‘checklist’ approach, with gradual shift towards more 
emphasis on inflation 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
1993-96  informal inflation targets for underlying inflation over 
unclear period, targets met 
loose inflation 
targeting LIT 
1997-
2014 
formal inflation targets (now endorsed by government, 
with central bank independent), initially for underlying 
inflation but from 1998 for headline CPI, on average, 
over the cycle; inflation target numbers exceeded 
between mid-2000 and mid-2001 and inflation 
expectations rise, but actual and expected inflation 
rapidly revert and formal target refers to cycle; smaller 
and shorter--lived rise in actual and expected inflation 
mid-2008;  inflation target numbers met in other years 
full inflation 
targeting FIT 
Selected IMF references: RED 1978 pp48-9, 64; SR 1978 pp8, 9; RED 1979 pp24, 30; RED 
1981 pp35-7; RED 1983 pp52-6, 69-70; RED 1986 pp51-5, 57-8, 68; RED 1991 pp36-7, 38; 
SR 1995 p16; RED 1996 pp22-3; RED 1997 pp22-3; SR 2000 pp8-9; SR 2001 pp14-16, 28-
8; SR 2002 pp6-7; SR 2003 pp5, 8, 27; SR 2008, pp5, 13. 
Additional sources: Grenville (1997); MacFarlane (1997). 
 
Second, Germany pursued monetary targets for most of the pre-EMU period (as an 
intermediate means to controlling inflation), but it also intervened in the foreign exchange 
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market from time to time, to an extent that varied with both EMS and wider international 
developments: 
Germany 
Years Targets and attainment Classification 
1974 aim of restricting growth of central bank money but no 
announced target; forex interventions within Snake 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
1975-85 monetary targets mostly met, forex intervention mainly 
vs USD but sometimes vs European currencies within 
Snake, then from 1979 within EMS; monetary control 
mainly via OMOs and rediscount facilities 
monetary with 
exchange rate 
targeting MwERT 
1986-87 monetary targets overshot, interest rates and heavy 
forex intervention used to limit appreciation  
exchange rate with 
monetary targeting 
ERwMT 
1988-91 monetary targets attained; German Economic, Monetary 
and Social Union May 1990 
MwERT 
1992-93 monetary target overshot 1992, barely attained 1993; 
heavy intervention in ERM upheavals 
ERwMT 
1994-8 monetary targets attained 4 years out of 5, in hardening 
EMS 
MwERT 
1999-
2014 
membership of European Monetary Union currency union CU  
Selected IMF references: RED 1975 pp31 -3, 43; RED 1982 pp31-2, 42-4, 56; RED 1985 
pp31-4, 55-8; RED 1988 pp13-16, 35-6; EDSBI 1994 pp16-18. 
Additional sources: Houben (2000, especially pp 196-7, 308-9); Beyer et al (2009); Gros and 
Thygesen (1998, especially pp169-70). 
 
Third, Israel provides an example of a country which progressed from a very poorly functioning 
framework (and hyperinflation) in the 1980s by way of a crawling exchange rate to inflation 
targeting (with formal central bank independence coming particularly late in the process): 
Israel 
Years Targets and attainment Classification 
1974-85 unsuccessful attempts to stabilise currency (versus USD 
then basket then USD), then from 1977 float with 
recurring depreciations; high monetary growth and no 
formal targets, widespread indexation, recurring fiscal 
dominance, ending in hyperinflation in 1984-5 
unstructured 
discretion UD 
1986-91 serious stabilisation efforts from July 1985 (including 
currency reform and 'no printing' law) but continuing 
devaluations versus basket of major currencies 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
1992-94 preannounced exchange rate crawl intended to be 
consistent with informal inflation target; monetary 
operations increasingly focused on discount rate 
exchange rate with 
inflation targeting 
ERwIT 
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1995-96 exchange rate bands widened, informal inflation targets 
met 
inflation with 
exchange rate 
targeting IwERT 
1997-
2003 
exchange rate bands widening continuously, declining 
narrow formal inflation targets undershot 3 years and 
overshot 1 year out of 7 
loose converging 
inflation targeting 
LCIT 
2004-14 static inflation targets met 9 years and nearly met 2 
years out of 11; exchange rate bands, already so wide 
they were not relevant, scrapped 2005; some changes to 
inflation targeting procedures; significant forex 
purchases to limit appreciation 2008-11; central bank 
finally made independent from 2010 after long delays 
full inflation 
targeting FIT 
Selected IMF references: SR 1977 p10; RED 1984 p44; RED 1985 p56; RED 1987 pp58-60, 
81, 105; SR 1987 pp9-10; RED 1989 p49; SR 1991 pp11-12; RED 1993 pp16-18, 39; SR 
1996 pp10-12; SR 1998 pp21-4; SISA 1999 pp20-22; SISA 2000 pp57-8; SR 2000 pp22-5; 
SR 2001 pp16-17; SI 2005 chI; SR 2008 p8; SR 2010 pp18, 23, 27; SIP 2012 chIII; SR 2014 
p9. 
Additional source: Barkai and Liviatan (2007); Bank of Israel (2007). 
 
Fourth, Argentina developed from multiple direct controls in the mid-1970s through 
unstructured discretion (and recurring hyperinflation) in the 1980s to the use of an augmented 
currency board in the 1990s; the collapse of the currency board in 2001 was followed by a short 
period of policy incoherence, succeeded by a period in which instruments were at least partly 
effective and objectives at least partly coherent: 
Argentina 
Years Targets and attainment Classification 
1974-6 multiple exchange rates, direct controls on bank lending, 
bank deposits nationalised (from 1973) 
multiple direct 
controls MDC 
1977-90 bank deposits denationalised, central bank gets more 
autonomy, interest rates still controlled, some 
liberalisation of forex market; repeated unsuccessful 
attempts at exchange rate-based stabilisation, each ending 
with overvaluation; alternation of multiple and unified 
exchange rates; recurring fiscal dominance; monetary 
control weak with poor instruments poorly wielded, real 
interest rates repeatedly negative; central bank remains 
important source of credit to private as well as public 
sector; some parallel financial markets  
unstructured 
discretion UD 
1991-
2001 
currency board with some monetary policy ('convertibility 
plan'): central bank can vary reserve requirements and has 
some small scope to buy government securities and to lend 
to private sector, also limited role as lender of last resort 
augmented 
currency board 
ACB 
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2002 exit from currency board late 2001 in conditions of forex 
and banking crisis and government debt default, followed 
by period of political and economic policy incoherence, in 
terms of both instruments and objectives; emergency 
measures of various kinds 
unstructured 
discretion UD 
2003-14 some initial economic and financial stabilisation with bank 
and debt restructuring, economic recovery from late 2002; 
but from about mid-2000s gradual but accelerating 
recourse to direct controls of various kinds (including from 
2012 import controls), and fiscal dominance (central bank 
independence weakened 2012); very wide but ineffective 
monetary targets; exchange rate heavily managed 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
Selected IMF references: RED 1974 p31; RED 1977 p25, 40-1, 50-2; RED 1984 p34-5; RED 
1990 Appendix IV; BP 1992, pp1-11; RED 1993 pp17-19; SI 2002 chII; SR 2005 pp20-1; SI 
2006 pp4-9; SR 2006 pp16-18; Argentina Economic Developments 2013/2014/2015 (all 
published February 2016; no regular consultations between 2006 and 2016).  
Additional reference: Wolf et al. (2008, esp. ch8). 
 
Finally, Turkey had a long period of incoherent policy, with some improvements mainly in 
instruments in the 1990s, then moved to inflation targets from 2002 but struggled to meet those 
targets on a consistent basis and in some periods its framework has to be reclassified as loosely 
structured discretion: 
Turkey 
Years Targets and attainment Classification 
1974-88 exchange rate adjusted frequently (more fixed than 
targeted); monetary policy operated mainly through 
direct instruments; strong element of fiscal dominance; 
1986-88 monetary targets repeatedly missed; lack of 
clarity over objectives, with repeated returns to 
expansion before inflation fully controlled 
unstructured 
discretion UD 
1989-
2002 
exchange rate more market-determined; central bank 
now operating more through indirect instruments; but 
objectives less than coherent, recurring fiscal 
dominance; first inflation target 2002 well undershot 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
2003-5 wide informal/implicit inflation targets (+/-2% band) hit loose inflation 
targeting LIT 
2006-8 wide formal inflation targets overshot, no evidence of 
expectations remaining anchored 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
2009-13 wide inflation targets met except for 2011, when 
expectations remain partly within band 
loose inflation 
targeting LIT 
2014 wide inflation target well overshot, and expectations 
well above band 
loosely structured 
discretion LSD 
Selected IMF references: RED 1985 section III.1; RED 1990 pp1-2, 22-23, 31; SR 2004 pp4, 
26, 40; SR 2013 pp11-12; SI 2014 pp11-18; SR 2014 pp16-19. 
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4 Findings 
We can now consider the overall results of the classification. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
countries using each of the 32 frameworks by year, from 1974 to 2014. The most obvious 
trends are that full exchange rate targeting became more important over time but then declined, 
and loose exchange rate targeting was initially important but declined, while full inflation 
targeting grew strongly from the early 1990s and loose inflation targeting was also significant 
in the last decade or so. Table 5.1 shows the number and percentage of countries using each 
framework by subperiods, where 1974-84 can be thought of as the pre-Great Moderation 
subperiod, the Great Moderation itself is divided into pre-EMU (1985-98) and EMU (1999-
2007) subperiods, and the final subperiod is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its aftermath 
(2008-14). The rise over time of full and also loose inflation targeting is clear, as is the varying 
importance of full and loose exchange rate targeting, and the relatively low frequency of (any 
type of) monetary targeting (which reflects in large part the frequent failure to attain targets). 
In the discretion category, unstructured declines rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, loosely 
structured rises and falls but remains important, and well structured is always infrequent. The 
sharp rise in membership of currency unions in 1999 and the frequency before 1999 of 
combinations of exchange rate with monetary or inflation targeting (mostly in countries which 
were moving towards EMU), can also be seen. 
[Figures 1-3 and Tables 5.1-3 near here] 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3, and Figures 2 and 3, separate out the advanced from the emerging 
economies. While the general trends are broadly comparable, in the former group the 
prevalence and the rise of inflation targeting are stronger, with a shift from LIT to FIT in the 
final subperiod, and there is a large move towards participation in the EMU currency union (in 
which case there is no separately identifiable monetary policy framework for the individual 
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members); those three frameworks, LIT, FIT and CU, constitute almost 90% of the frameworks 
in the final subperiod. In the emerging group, on the other hand, inflation targeting is 
consistently less, and exchange rate targeting more, frequent than for the advanced economies, 
but the same shift from the latter to the former is evident (though later); UD almost disappears 
but LSD declines but remains important in the final subperiod. 
 
Figures 4-6 and Tables 6.1-3 provide alternative perspectives based on the aggregation of 
frameworks by target variable (as set out in Table 4). They again make clear the very high 
degree to which (the broad category of) inflation targeting comes to dominate the frameworks 
of the advanced economies by the end of the period, to the detriment of both discretion and 
exchange rate targeting. This is particularly clear from Figure 4 if account is taken of the fact 
that the framework for EMU is one of loose inflation targeting (given the European Central 
Bank's definition of price stability rather than inflation target), but still obvious in Figure 5  
where participation in currency unions is excluded (it is also excluded from Tables 6.1-3).20 
For the emerging economies, there is a later and less strong rise in inflation targeting at the 
expense of loosely structured discretion and exchange rate targeting, while direct controls and 
exchange rate fixes disappear in the second half of the period. In addition, for both country 
groups there is a decline over time in the frequency of the discretion frameworks and a clear 
switch in the type of discretion from UD to LSD, with this switch taking place earlier and more 
strongly among the advanced economies. 
[Figures 4-6 and Tables 6.1-3 near here] 
 
                                                 
20 Exercises of this sort in effect weight individual countries or currency areas equally, so that the 11 EMU 
members in Figure 5 before EMU are replaced by the one currency area from 1999. 
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Figures 7 and 8 and Tables 7.1-3 provide comparable results (excluding CUs) for the 
aggregation by degree of monetary control. For the advanced economies they show the 
disappearance of 'intermediate' and the shrinking of the 'substantial’' categories, in favour of 
‘intensive’ frameworks (full targeting and well structured discretion). For the emerging 
economies, which have a small but significant amount of 'rudimentary' frameworks (mostly 
multiple direct controls) to start with, 'intermediate' frameworks more or less disappear 
sometime after the middle of the period but ‘substantial' remain at about 60% of the sample, 
whereas for the advanced economies they are down to about 40%; on the other hand, in the 
final subperiod ‘intensive’ frameworks are found in about 60% of the advanced and about 40% 
of the emerging economies. 
 
Table 8 offers a different perspective on the evolution of the frameworks. It identifies the 
number of episodes (defined as one country having a given framework for one or more years) 
and the average duration of those episodes for each framework. The final three columns show 
the incidence of the frameworks in the start- and end-years and in 1998, just before the major 
change to EMU. It is clear that the frameworks which have the most episodes and relatively 
long durations are ACB and CU, followed by FERT and FIT, then LSD, then various loose 
targeting frameworks. Many of the mixed target cases have few episodes and low durations, 
but this is less true for monetary-exchange rate mixes. On the other hand, full and loose 
monetary targeting have relatively few episodes and less than average durations (the average 
duration for all (non-zero) frameworks is 7.8 years). 
 
The main trends highlighted by this classification are the evolution of monetary policy 
frameworks over time first towards inflation targeting of one sort or another, and secondly 
towards better structured and disciplined frameworks using more precise indirect rather than 
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less precise direct instruments. While more work needs to be done on the determinants of 
countries' choices, in broad terms these trends should probably be seen as the result of (i) 
increasing clarity on the part of monetary authorities (and also governments and societies) with 
respect to the feasible objectives of monetary policy, reflecting both experience and the 
changes in understanding of basic macroeconomic relationships; and (ii) the development of 
financial infrastructure (especially government securities and interbank money markets), itself 
sometimes the result of deliberate government policy designed to enable better monetary 
control but sometimes more incidental. In addition the movement towards monetary union in 
Europe has had a major impact on monetary policy frameworks, both in the efforts made by 
countries to qualify for EMU (in particular, the pursuit of hard exchange rate targets by smaller 
countries or mixed targets by larger ones for that purpose) and in the resulting replacement of 
individual national frameworks by the (loose inflation targeting) framework of the Euro area. 
Of the other frameworks discussed, successful monetary targeting of different kinds has been 
much less frequent in advanced economies and absent in emerging, while exchange rate 
targeting of different kinds remains important for emerging economies (and probably even 
more so for the developing economies not classified here). Loosely structured discretion has 
been common, and continues to be so for emerging economies: this should be understood as 
involving different mixes of objective clarity and instrument effectiveness, with these elements 
varying considerably over time in individual countries. Well structured discretion, on the other 
hand, is rare: it seems that when countries' monetary authorities are really clear about their 
objectives and in possession of fully effective instruments they tend to opt for specified 
inflation targets. 
 
5 Economic performance 
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Tables 9.1-2 report the results of a simple unconditional analysis of the inflation and growth 
performance associated (contemporaneously) with each of the different aggregations of 
frameworks. The total row at the bottom makes clear how inflation has been brought, and 
maintained, under control in the advanced economies since the 1970s, and in the emerging 
economies from a higher starting point in the second subperiod, and that economic growth has 
been much lower since the GFC in 2008.  
 
For the advanced economies, in terms of the target variable aggregation the lowest inflation 
rates are for exchange rate targets and LSD in the third subperiod and mixed targets in the 
fourth, but these involve only two or three countries each and are dominated by the 
disinflationary experiences of Hong Kong and Japan in the third and Switzerland in the fourth 
subperiod. Apart from these, the striking result here is that inflation is lowest under inflation 
targeting in every subperiod, while economic growth under inflation targeting is average or 
above average in all cases. The table also shows that performance under the 'intensive' control 
frameworks is mostly superior to that under ‘substantial’ control frameworks, particularly in 
the earlier periods. For the emerging economies the most striking result is that inflation and 
growth performance under LSD is much superior to that under UD, while performance under 
inflation targeting is sometimes but not always better than that under exchange rate targeting, 
and performance under intensive control frameworks is better than under substantial control 
frameworks for all except the first subperiod (when the incidence of intensive cases is very 
low). 
[Tables 9.1-2 near here] 
 
This unconditional analysis does not take account of other factors affecting inflation and 
growth: for example, some of the frameworks with higher growth in Tables 9.1-2 are ones that 
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occur mainly in emerging countries which perhaps naturally have higher (catch-up) growth 
rates. Clearly what is needed is a more detailed (conditional) analysis which takes account of 
other factors that influence countries’ economic performance. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper represents the first part of a wider research project on monetary policy frameworks 
which will eventually encompass developing economies as well. It is innovative in its sources 
and in its categories, which permit not just a finer but a multi-dimensional perspective on the 
range of frameworks which countries have used in different periods. It will therefore allow 
researchers to address more carefully a number of questions about the comparative 
performance of different frameworks, and about the choice of frameworks made by different 
countries in different periods.  
 
The following work is already planned or under way: conditional analysis of the association 
between different monetary policy frameworks and inflation, on the one hand, and growth on 
the other; investigating the effect of weighting the analysis by GDP or population (which 
provides, among other things, the obvious solution to the awkwardness of dealing with the 
creation of EMU); revisiting Ball's (2010) analysis of the effects of the transition to IT on 
inflation and other variables, for a wider range of transitions; and using the classification in 
attempting to identify the determinants of countries' choices of framework. 
 
In the meantime the paper has shown how monetary policy frameworks in both advanced and 
emerging economies have shifted over time towards heavier emphasis on inflation targeting 
(with less focus on exchange rates and much less on monetary aggregates) and more precise 
and systematic (‘full’ rather than ‘loose’) monetary strategies. Both these trends, but 
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particularly the latter, appear to be associated with improvements in economic performance, 
and  future work can hope to tease out their relative importance.  
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Table 1: The categories of the classification 
 full name acronym definition 
1 Multiple direct controls MDC multiple exchange rates and/or controls on direct lending, interest rates, etc 
2 Pure exchange rate fix PERF exchange rate fixed purely by intervention, no monetary instruments in use 
3 Augmented exchange rate fix  AERF exchange rate fixed by intervention, some basic monetary instruments in use 
4 Pure currency board  PCB domestic currency 100% backed by foreign currency, no monetary instruments in use 
5 Augmented currency board  ACB domestic currency 100% backed by foreign currency, basic monetary instruments in use 
6 Unstructured discretion UD ineffective set of instruments and incoherent mix of objectives  
7 Loose exchange rate targeting LERT narrow stationary targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
8 Loose converging exchange rate targeting LCERT converging narrow targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
9 Loose monetary targeting LMT narrow stationary targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
10 Loose converging monetary targeting LCMT converging narrow targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
11 Loose inflation targeting LIT narrow stationary targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
12 Loose converging inflation targeting LCIT converging narrow targets not well hit or wider targets attained 
13 Monetary with exchange rate targeting MwERT monetary targets and exchange rate fixes or targets, monetary dominant 
14 Exchange rate with monetary targeting ERwMT monetary targets and exchange rate fixes or targets, exchange rate dominant 
15 Monetary plus exchange rate targeting M&ERT monetary targets and exchange rate fixes or targets, primacy unclear 
16 Monetary with inflation targeting MwIT monetary and inflation targets, monetary dominant 
17 Inflation with monetary targeting IwMT monetary and inflation targets, inflation dominant 
18 Monetary plus inflation targeting M&IT monetary and inflation targets, primacy unclear 
19 Inflation with exchange rate targeting IwERT inflation targets and exchange rate (fixes or) targets, inflation dominant 
20 Exchange rate with inflation targeting ERwIT inflation targets and exchange rate (fixes or) targets, exchange rate dominant 
21 Inflation plus exchange rate targeting I&ERT inflation targets and exchange rate (fixes or) targets, primacy unclear 
22 Exchange rate, monetary, inflation targeting ER&M&IT three full targets (or fixes), whichever dominant 
23 Loosely structured discretion  LSD instruments not effective or objectives not coherent or both only partly so 
24 Use of another sovereign's currency  UASC dollarisation or euroization 
25 Currency union membership CU currency union  
26 Full exchange rate targeting FERT narrow announced stationary targets typically attained 
27 Full converging exchange rate targeting FCERT narrow announced converging targets typically attained 
28 Full monetary targeting FMT narrow announced stationary targets typically attained 
29 Full converging monetary targeting FCMT narrow announced converging targets typically attained 
30 Full inflation targeting FIT narrow announced stationary targets typically attained 
31 Full converging inflation targeting FCIT narrow announced converging targets typically attained 
32 Well structured discretion  WSD full and effective set of monetary instruments and coherent set of objectives 
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Table 2: Criteria and definitions 
criteria definition 
full targeting narrow stationary targets typically attained 
narrow target for exchange rates, margins of +/- 2.25% or less; 
for monetary aggregates, point targets or target ranges of 3% or less; 
for inflation, point targets or target ranges of 2% or less 
stationary targets which do not change from year to year 
typically attained outcomes within 1% of target range or within 2% of point target; one larger divergence from target per 3 years 
overlooked (or more if expectations remain anchored) 
loose narrow targets missed but by no more than 1% more than criteria for full targeting; or wider targets attained on 
those criteria 
wider for exchange rates, margins wider than 2.25% but less than 10%; 
for monetary aggregates, target ranges > 3% but less than 6%; 
for inflation, target ranges > 2% but less than 5%;  
also targets which are less clearly specified, or even unannounced   
converging targets which decline over time 
dominant where there are two types of targets and one is attained but the other is not 
primacy unclear where it is not possible to identify which type of targets is dominant 
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Table 3: Key distinctions between related categories 
related pairs key distinctions 
ERF versus ERT in exchange rate fixes there is no separate autonomous foreign exchange market and the central bank is either a party to or 
sets the terms of every transaction; in exchange rate targeting there is an autonomous FX market in which agents are free to 
operate and the central bank intervenes from time to time 
PERF vs AERF in both the central bank ‘fixes’ the exchange rate; in AERF but not in PERF there are some other basic monetary policy 
instruments in use, typically aimed at other objectives 
PERF or AERF 
vs PCB or ACB 
in PCB or ACB (but not in PERF or AERF) all domestic currency is backed by foreign exchange reserves, which makes 
them more tightly regulated arrangements 
AERF vs UD in AERF the central bank deploys some basic monetary instruments but the ‘fixing’ of the exchange rate is the centrepiece 
of policy; in USD there may be some (temporary, varying) fixing or targeting of the exchange rate but the authorities are 
concerned with other objectives and are deploying a (limited) range of monetary instruments for those purposes 
PCB vs ACB in PCB there are no monetary policy instruments in use, in ACB there are some basic instruments available and used 
MDC vs UD MDC represents a command economy, where the financial system is merely the counterpart of the planning process, whereas 
in UD there is some kind of autonomous banking system which is at least partly independent of any state planning 
mechanism, within a wider context of markets which may be severely distorted but still function as markets 
UD vs LSD in UD the monetary policy instruments available are not effective (capable of producing the desired result) and the monetary 
policy objectives (with the trade-offs between them) are not clear; in LSD either the instruments are not effective but the 
objectives are clear, or the instruments are effective but the objectives are not clear, or both of these are satisfied only in 
part 
LSD vs WSD in WSD the instruments are effective (which implies the existence of an interbank money market and a government securities 
market) and the objectives (with the trade-offs between them) are clear; in LSD financial markets are less complete while 
instruments are less effective and/or objectives less clear 
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Table 4: Two useful  aggregations 
by target variable: frameworks Numbers 
direct controls MDC 1 
exchange rate fix PERF, AERF, PCB 2,3,4 
exchange rate target ACB, FERT, FCERT, LERT, LCERT 5,7,8,26,27 
monetary target FMT, FCMT, LMT, LCMT 9,10,28,29 
inflation target FIT, FCIT, LIT, LCIT 11,12,30,31 
mixed targets MwERT, ERwMT, M&ERT, MwIT, IwMT, 
M&IT, IwERT, ERwIT, I&ERT, ER&M&IT 
13-22 
unstructured discretion UD 6 
loosely structured discretion LSD 23 
well structured discretion WSD 32 
by degree of monetary control   
rudimentary control MDC, PERF 1,2 
intermediate control AERF, PCB, UD 3,4,6 
substantial control ACB, all LC*T, all FC*T, all L*T, all mixes, 
LSD 
5,7-12,13-23, 
27,29,31 
intensive control FERT, FMT, FIT, WSD 26,28,30,32 
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Table 5.1: Incidence of frameworks by category and period, full sample 
 1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
X 173  99  74  0  0  
MDC 70 3.06 57 10.16 13 1.70 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PERF 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
AERF 104 4.55 83 14.80 21 2.74 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PCB 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ACB 104 4.55 6 1.07 35 4.57 39 7.22 24 5.71 
UD 229 10.01 128 22.82 90 11.75 6 1.11 5 1.19 
LERT 145 6.34 80 14.26 51 6.66 14 2.59 0 0.00 
LCERT 13 0.57 7 1.25 6 0.78 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LMT 36 1.57 21 3.74 15 1.96 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LCMT 14 0.61 11 1.96 3 0.39 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LIT 158 6.91 0 0.00 24 3.13 73 13.52 61 14.52 
LCIT 58 2.54 0 0.00 12 1.57 33 6.11 13 3.10 
MwERT 39 1.71 22 3.92 14 1.83 3 0.56 0 0.00 
ERwMT 16 0.70 0 0.00 14 1.83 2 0.37 0 0.00 
M&ERT 15 0.66 2 0.36 13 1.70 0 0.00 0 0.00 
MwIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
M&IT 2 0.09 0 0.00 2 0.26 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwERT 10 0.44 0 0.00 4 0.52 2 0.37 4 0.95 
ERwIT 6 0.26 0 0.00 3 0.39 3 0.56 0 0.00 
I&ERT 8 0.35 0 0.00 4 0.52 3 0.56 1 0.24 
ER&M&IT 2 0.09 0 0.00 2 0.26 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LSD 526 23.00 94 16.76 259 33.81 115 21.30 58 13.81 
UASC 25 1.09 11 1.96 14 1.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 
CU 223 9.75 0 0.00 0 0.00 107 19.81 116 27.62 
FERT 224 9.79 26 4.63 118 15.40 53 9.81 27 6.43 
FCERT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FMT 11 0.48 3 0.53 8 1.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FCMT 14 0.61 10 1.78 4 0.52 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FIT 220 9.62 0 0.00 31 4.05 85 15.74 104 24.76 
FCIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
WSD 15 0.66 0 0.00 6 0.78 2 0.37 7 1.67 
Note: percentages are of total minus the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) 
exist as a separate entity. 
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Table 5.2: Incidence of frameworks by category and period, advanced economies 
 1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
X 25  11  14  0  0  
MDC 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PERF 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
AERF 8 0.74 8 2.80 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PCB 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ACB 36 3.33 6 2.10 14 3.85 9 3.70 7 3.70 
UD 57 5.27 51 17.83 6 1.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LERT 85 7.86 66 23.08 17 4.67 2 0.82 0 0.00 
LCERT 13 1.20 7 2.45 6 1.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LMT 36 3.33 21 7.34 15 4.12 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LCMT 14 1.29 11 3.85 3 0.82 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LIT 94 8.69 0 0.00 24 6.59 42 17.28 28 14.81 
LCIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
MwERT 35 3.23 22 7.69 13 3.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ERwMT 16 1.48 0 0.00 14 3.85 2 0.82 0 0.00 
M&ERT 15 1.39 2 0.70 13 3.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 
MwIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
M&IT 2 0.18 0 0.00 2 0.55 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwERT 6 0.55 0 0.00 2 0.55 0 0.00 4 2.12 
ERwIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
I&ERT 4 0.37 0 0.00 4 1.10 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER&M&IT 2 0.18 0 0.00 2 0.55 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LSD 129 11.92 45 15.73 67 18.41 12 4.94 5 2.65 
UASC 25 2.31 11 3.85 14 3.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 
CU 190 17.56 0 0.00 0 0.00 106 43.62 84 44.44 
FERT 138 12.75 23 8.04 99 27.20 9 3.70 7 3.70 
FCERT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FMT 11 1.02 3 1.05 8 2.20 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FCMT 14 1.29 10 3.50 4 1.10 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FIT 146 13.49 0 0.00 31 8.52 61 25.10 54 28.57 
FCIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
WSD 6 0.55 0 0.00 6 1.65 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Note: percentages are of total minus the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) 
exist as a separate entity. 
. 
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Table 5.3: Incidence of frameworks by category and period, emerging economies 
 1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
X 147  88  60  0  0  
MDC 70 5.80 57 20.73 13 3.23 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PERF 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
AERF 91 7.55 75 27.27 21 5.22 0 0.00 0 0.00 
PCB 1 0.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ACB 67 5.56 0 0.00 21 5.22 30 10.10 17 7.36 
UD 170 14.10 77 28.00 84 20.90 6 2.02 5 2.16 
LERT 60 4.98 14 5.09 34 8.46 12 4.04 0 0.00 
LCERT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LCMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LIT 57 4.73 0 0.00 0 0.00 25 8.42 32 13.85 
LCIT 65 5.39 0 0.00 12 2.99 39 13.13 14 6.06 
MwERT 4 0.33 0 0.00 1 0.25 3 1.01 0 0.00 
ERwMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
M&ERT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
MwIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
M&IT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IwERT 4 0.33 0 0.00 2 0.50 2 0.67 0 0.00 
ERwIT 6 0.50 0 0.00 3 0.75 3 1.01 0 0.00 
I&ERT 4 0.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 1.01 1 0.43 
ER&M&IT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LSD 400 33.17 49 17.82 192 47.76 99 33.33 53 22.94 
UASC 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
CU 33 2.74 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.34 32 13.85 
FERT 86 7.13 3 1.09 19 4.73 44 14.81 20 8.66 
FCERT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FCMT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
FIT 74 6.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 24 8.08 50 21.65 
FCIT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
WSD 14 1.16 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 2.02 7 3.03 
Note: percentages are of total minus the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) 
exist as a separate entity. 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 6.1: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by target variable and period, full sample  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
direct controls 70 3.43 57 10.36 13 1.73 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER fix 104 5.10 83 15.09 21 2.79 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER target 486 23.84 119 21.64 210 27.93 106 24.48 51 16.78 
MT 75 3.68 45 8.18 30 3.99 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IT 436 21.38 0 0.00 67 8.91 191 44.11 178 58.55 
mixed targets 98 4.81 24 4.36 56 7.45 13 3.00 5 1.64 
UD 229 11.23 128 23.27 90 11.97 6 1.39 5 1.64 
LSD 526 25.80 94 17.09 259 34.44 115 26.56 58 19.08 
WSD 15 0.74 0 0.00 6 0.80 2 0.46 7 2.30 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
 
Table 6.2: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by target variable and period, advanced economies  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
direct controls 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER fix 8 0.92 8 2.91 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER target 272 31.37 102 37.09 136 38.86 20 14.60 14 13.33 
MT 75 8.65 45 16.36 30 8.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IT 240 27.68 0 0.00 55 15.71 103 75.18 82 78.10 
mixed targets 80 9.23 24 8.73 50 14.29 2 1.46 4 3.81 
UD 57 6.57 51 18.55 6 1.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 
LSD 129 14.88 45 16.36 67 19.14 12 8.76 5 4.76 
WSD 6 0.69 0 0.00 6 1.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
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Table 6.3: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by target variable and period, emerging economies  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
direct controls 70 5.97 57 20.73 13 3.23 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER fix 96 8.19 75 27.27 21 5.22 0 0.00 0 0.00 
ER target 214 18.26 17 6.18 74 18.41 86 29.05 37 18.59 
MT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
IT 196 16.72 0 0.00 12 2.99 88 29.73 96 48.24 
mixed targets 18 1.54 0 0.00 6 1.49 11 3.72 1 0.50 
UD 172 14.68 77 28.00 84 20.90 6 2.03 5 2.51 
LSD 397 33.87 49 17.82 192 47.76 103 34.80 53 26.63 
WSD 9 0.77 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 0.68 7 3.52 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
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Table 7.1: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by degree of monetary control and period, full sample  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
rudimentary 70 3.43 57 10.36 13 1.73 0 0.00 0 0.00 
intermediate 333 16.33 211 38.36 111 14.76 6 1.39 5 1.64 
substantial 1166 57.18 253 46.00 465 61.84 287 66.28 161 52.96 
intensive 470 23.05 29 5.27 163 21.68 140 32.33 138 45.39 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
 
Table 7.2: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by degree of monetary control and period, advanced economies  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
rudimentary 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
intermediate 65 7.50 59 21.45 6 1.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 
substantial 501 57.79 190 69.09 200 57.14 67 48.91 44 41.90 
intensive 301 34.72 26 9.45 144 41.14 70 51.09 61 58.10 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
 
 
Table 7.3: Incidence of frameworks aggregated by degree of monetary control and period, emerging economies  
1974-2014 1974-84 1985-1998 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % 
rudimentary 70 5.97 57 20.73 13 3.23 0 0.00 0 0.00 
intermediate 268 22.87 152 55.27 105 26.12 6 2.03 5 2.51 
substantial 665 56.74 63 22.91 265 65.92 220 74.32 117 58.79 
intensive 169 14.42 3 1.09 19 4.73 70 23.65 77 38.69 
Note: percentages are of the total minus the sum of the Xs, which are cases where the country does not (yet) exist as a   
separate entity, and the UASCs and the CUs, where the country has no specific national monetary policy framework. 
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Table 8.1: Duration of frameworks by country type 
 Advanced Emerging All countries All countries 
 Episodes Duration Episodes Duration Episodes Duration Incidence 1974 Incidence 1998 Incidence 2014 
MDC 0 0 7 10 7 10 7 0 0 
PERF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AERF 2 4 11 8.7 13 8 11 0 0 
PCB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ACB 2 18 4 17 6 17.3 1 5 3 
UD 6 9.5 20 8.6 26 8.8 10 2 1 
LERT 10 8.3 6 10 16 8.9 7 3 0 
LCERT 2 7.5 0 0 2 7.5 0 0 0 
LMT 7 5.1 0 0 7 5.1 1 0 0 
LCMT 2 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 
LIT 9 10.4 9 7.1 18 8.8 0 2 7 
LCIT 0 0 9 6.4 9 6.4 0 4 1 
MwERT 5 7 1 4 6 6.5 0 2 0 
ERwMT 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 1 0 
M&ERT 3 5 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 
MwIT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IwMT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M&IT 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
IwERT 2 3 1 4 3 3.3 0 1 1 
ERwIT 0 0 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 
I&ERT 1 4 1 4 2 4 0 1 0 
ER&M&IT 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 
LSD 20 6.5 30 13.2 50 10.5 10 19 8 
UASC 1 25 0 0 1 25 1 1 0 
CU 12 15.8 5 6.6 17 13.1 0 0 18 
FERT 11 12.5 7 12.3 18 12.4 3 11 3 
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FCERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FMT 2 5.5 0 0 2 5.5 0 0 0 
FCMT 2 7 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 
FIT 10 14.6 8 9.25 18 12.2 0 6 17 
FCIT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WSD 1 6 1 9 2 7.5 0 0 1 
Note: duration is the average duration of each framework across all episodes.  
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Table 9.1: Economic performance by aggregated framework and period, advanced economies 
 1974-84 1985-98 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 inflation growth inflation growth inflation growth inflation growth 
Direct controls .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ER fix 16.66 4.55 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ER target 10.14 2.19 4.12 2.60 0.84 3.02 2.78 0.82 
MT 10.50 4.47 4.55 4.08 .. .. .. .. 
IT .. .. 1.96 2.58 2.07 2.72 2.06 0.63 
mixed targets 9.35 2.15 3.93 2.38 2.90 3.09 -0.17 0.51 
UD 24.25 0.51 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
LSD 8.89 0.54 6.37 1.99 1.23 1.80 .. .. 
WSD .. .. 3.50 1.20 .. .. .. .. 
         
rudimentary .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
intermediate 23.09 1.86 17.72 0.97 .. .. .. .. 
substantial 10.16 1.74 5.12 2.59 1.51 2.70 2.64 0.53 
intensive 7.61 0.93 2.95 2.49 2.14 2.69 2.13 0.54 
         
total 12.25 2.40 4.36 2.58 2.06 2.58 2.06 -0.05 
Note: the total row shows the average inflation and growth under all frameworks, including UASC and CU. 
 
 
  
46 
 
Table 9.2: Economic performance by aggregated framework and period, emerging economies 
 1974-84 1985-98 1999-2007 2008-2014 
 inflation growth inflation growth inflation growth inflation growth 
Direct controls 32.29 4.18 4.41 4.30 .. .. .. .. 
ER fix 10.67 4.55 4.11 4.25 .. .. .. .. 
ER target 7.77 3.98 12.63 4.27 2.96 4.62 3.59 0.52 
MT .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
IT .. .. 10.42 4.45 4.15 3.64 4.22 2.23 
mixed targets .. .. 10.74 3.29 5.00 5.25 4.60 5.54 
UD 91.07 1.35 342.66 0.15 40.89 2.19 35.63 0.92 
LSD 17.29 1.84 78.73 2.01 10.09 4.09 8.88 2.37 
WSD .. .. .. .. 2.82 5.54 2.55 2.31 
         
rudimentary 32.29 4.18 4.41 4.30 .. .. .. .. 
intermediate 49.20 2.92 277.03 1.12 40.89 2.19 35.63 0.92 
substantial 14.68 2.40 60.92 2.64 6.97 4.11 6.74 1.94 
intensive 18.23 2.23 7.56 3.49 2.67 4.34 3.12 2.00 
         
total 37.75 2.88 112.15 2.25 6.63 4.13 5.50 1.76 
Note: the total row shows the average inflation and growth under all frameworks, including UASC and CU. 
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Figure 1: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks over time, full sample of countries, full menu of frameworks 
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Figure 2: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, advanced economies, full menu 
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Figure 3: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, emerging economies, full menu 
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Figure 4: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, advanced economies, by target variable 
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Figure 5: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, advanced economies, by target variable, excluding CUs 
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Figure 6: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, emerging economies, by target variable 
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Figure 7: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, advanced economies, by degree of monetary control, excluding CUs 
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Figure 8: Incidence of monetary policy frameworks, emerging economies, by degree of monetary control, excluding CUs 
 
